Released To Service

The AEI Safety Newsletter

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AIRCRAFT ENGINEERS INTERNATIONAL

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WELCOME

to the second edition of Released to Service

EASA and AEI: A Partnership for Aviation Safety

Safe air travel is not inevitable, it is the product of professional behaviour merged with lessons learned. The moment this relationship is broken or even slightly weakened, accidents are more probable. Air travel is set to increase dramatically in the coming decade and so with commercial pressure becoming ever more influential in terms of how we manage engineering and maintenance, a huge team effort will be required to ensure flying remains safe. Licensed Aircraft Engineers have the ability to positively influence safety and therefore have a significant role to play. Yet to achieve the best results, support from both industry and regulators is required. These subjects remained prominent during very positive discussions with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) with both AEI and EASA recognising that by working more closely together, safety will benefit most. Following my recent meeting with the EASA Executive Director, Patrick Ky, he kindly agreed to write an article related to the importance of the regulator supporting and increasing co-operation with licensed engineers. This is to be welcomed and the opportunity it offers to enhance safety should be embraced. However, it isn't a one way street and engineers need to play their part too by being consistently professional and vigilant to safety lapses. Indeed, safety lapses should always be reported via the appropriate reporting system. 'EASA and AEI, a partnership for safety' can be found on page 3.

Risk Culture

High risk levels are often accompanied by a poor safety culture. Although there are now regulations in force aimed at properly assessing and mitigating risk, these remain focussed primarily on data from past events according to Cengiz Turkoglu from the 'Cranfield Safety and Accident Investigation Centre' (CSAIC). There is an argument however these models do not specifically aim to explore how risk is perceived and managed at different levels in organisations. Cengiz has chosen the topic of 'Risk Culture in Commercial Air Transport' for his PhD research. Cengiz who is Chairman of the International Federation of Airworthiness (IFA) Technical Committee (of which AEI is a member) is also a Licensed Aircraft Engineer. Cengiz would very much appreciate your support for his research into risk culture by completing his survey. AEI has endorsed this survey as it has the potential to really benefit not only Licensed Engineers going about their work but also safety.

Please assist Cengiz by completing his survey. Article and link to the survey can be found on page 18.

Robert Alway, AEI President

Finally, AEI have released a promotional video which can be viewed by **CLICKING HERE**. The video will be produced in a number of languages and these will be available soon on the AEI website. Please assist in making sure we reach out to every engineer upholding safety wherever they work in the world.

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EASA Executive Director, Patrick Ky

EASA AND AEI: A partnership for Aviation Safety

English

Aviation safety is difficult to achieve if working alone, but it is much easier when working together as a team. For this reason, it is EASA's strategic pursuit to work jointly and more closely with AEI.

EASA strongly believes in this partnership, as the role of engineers in the aviation system cannot be overestimated. They have an important role to play as they ensure that aircraft airworthiness is maintained. However, this is not their most critical role. Their crucial function is that of the 'eyes and ears' in the system; sensing what is actually taking place in aviation. Aircraft engineers are one of the largest and most robust safety barriers in the system, having first-hand information about possible safety risks in the maintenance environment.

We see opportunities to develop a constructive relationship with AEI and we are confident we will see more active participation from the association. The AEI and the Agency are on the same side, making all possible efforts to ensure that no misconduct activities are performed during the qualification of applicants for Part-66 licences. A robust safety reporting system can make a big difference towards achieving safety. However, for a reporting system to function, it is essential that organisations fully embrace a safety culture, not blaming but promoting the reporting of occurrences.

During the review of our regulations the Agency relies on the active input from all stakeholders to advise how rules can be best improved; making them more pragmatic and concurrent with operational reality. This is what we are currently seeking with the work on Part-66 and Part-147. As an outcome EASA and AEI want to see a strong Part-66 licensing system, supported by appropriate requirements for Part-147 maintenance training organisations. Adequate requirements are also needed for the assessment of the competence of certifying staff within maintenance organisations. The Agency recognises that work is still needed to better define the functions and responsibilities of these staff, for example in relation to the level of supervision and coordination expected before a certificate of 'release to service' can be issued. For this reason we have already started working towards bringing change[1].

It is a fact that more regulations will not necessarily bring more safety. The more proportionate, well-thought a rule is, the more effective it will be towards addressing the risks. To make a rule effective, one needs knowledge of the environment in which it will be applied and how it can be best targeted to achieve its intention. In this example the input from AEI will be invaluable.

During the October AEI conference in Reykjavik Iceland, the Agency will be there to provide an update on the latest activity and to listen to the input of AEI's members. We see our participation in the conference as a springboard to move our partnership further, joining forces in the common effort of aviation safety.

In the last months the relationship between EASA and AEI has gone through considerable positive changes. After our meeting, Robert Alway and myself are confident this cooperation will be further reinforced, becoming a synergy for safety. We have established quarterly meetings between EASA and AEI and we have welcomed the active contribution of AEI in our working groups. We believe that by joining forces in sharing information openly in a constructive manner we will work as an effective team, towards ensuring a high level of safety.

[1] This is being discussed within the existing rulemaking task RMT.0097 (145.024), where an NPA 2014-11 has already being issued.

EASA Y AEI: Una asociación para la seguridad aérea

Spanish

La seguridad aérea es difícil de conseguir trabajando en solitario, pero es mucho más sencillo cuando se trabaja conjuntamente, como un equipo. Por esta razón, LA EASA busca trabajar de forma más cercana y conjunta con la AEI.

EASA cree firmemente en esta asociación, ya que no se puede subestimar el papel de los Técnicos de Mantenimiento de Aeronaves en el sistema aéreo. Ellos desempeñan una importante función, ya que garantizan que se mantenga la aeronavegabilidad de la aeronave. Sin embargo, esta no es su función mas critica. Su función más crucial es la de ser los 'ojos y oídos' del sistema; detectar lo que sucede realmente en la aviación. Los Técnicos de Mantenimiento de Aeronaves son una de las barreras de seguridad más grandes y sólidas dentro del sistema, al tener información de primera mano acerca de los posibles riesgos de seguridad en el entorno del mantenimiento.

Vemos oportunidades para desarrollar una relación constructiva con la AEI y estamos seguros de que veremos una participación más activa de la asociación. La AEI y la Agencia están del mismo lado, el de hacer todos los esfuerzos posibles para garantizar que no se produzca ninguna mala praxis durante el proceso de cualificación de los solicitantes de licencias Parte 66. Un sistema de información sobre la seguridad robusto puede marcar la gran diferencia en el objetivo de lograrla. Sin embargo, para que funcione un sistema de notificaciones es esencial que las organizaciones inculquen plenamente una cultura de la seguridad, que no culpe, sino promocione el que se produzcan las notificaciones.

Durante la revisión de nuestras normativas la Agencia confía en las aportaciones de todas las partes interesadas respecto a cómo pueden mejorarse las normas; haciéndolas más pragmáticas y concurrentes con la realidad operacional. Esto es lo que buscamos en estos momentos con el trabajo en la Parte 66 y la Parte 147. Como resultado, la EASA y la AEI quieren ver un sistema de licencias Parte 66 fuerte, sustentado por unos requisitos adecuados para las organizaciones de formación de mantenimiento Parte 147. También son necesarios requisitos adecuados para la asegurar la cualificación del personal certificador en las Organizaciones de Mantenimiento. La Agencia reconoce que todavía se debe de trabajar para definir mejor las funciones y las responsabilidades de este personal, por ejemplo, en relación con el nivel de supervisión y de coordinación que se esperan antes de que pueda emitirse el certificado de 'listo para el servicio'. Por esta razón, ya hemos empezado a trabajar con el fin de poner en marcha el cambio[1].

Es un hecho que más normativas no producirán necesariamente más seguridad. Cuanto más proporcionada y bien pensada sea una norma, más eficaz será con vistas a hacer frente a los riesgos. Para hacer que una norma sea eficaz necesitamos conocer el entorno en el cual será aplicada y cómo se puede enfocar más eficazmente para lograr lo que se propone. En este sentido, las aportaciones de la AEI serán inestimables.

Durante la conferencia de la AEI en Reikiavik, Islandia, el próximo mes de Octubre, la Agencia estará disponible para proporcionar una puesta al día de la actividad más reciente y para escuchar las aportaciones de los miembros de la AEI. Vemos nuestra participación en la conferencia como un trampolín para llevar nuestra asociación más lejos, al unir nuestras fuerzas en un esfuerzo común por la seguridad aérea.

En los últimos meses, la relación entre la EASA y la AEI ha pasado por una serie considerables de cambios positivos. Después de nuestra reunión, Robert Alway y yo mismo nos sentimos confiados de que esta cooperación se fortalecerá aún más, convirtiéndose en una sinergia en pro de la seguridad. Hemos establecido unas reuniones trimestrales entre EASA y AEI y hemos acogido con satisfacción la contribución activa de la AEI en nuestros grupos de trabajo. Creemos que, al unir nuestras fuerzas, compartiendo abiertamente la información de una forma constructiva, trabajaremos como un equipo eficaz, con vistas a garantizar un alto nivel de seguridad.

[1] Esto se está tratando dentro de la tarea existente RMT.0097 (145.024), para crear la normativa, en la que ya se ha emitido una NPA 2014-11.

EASA VE AEI: Uçuş Emniyeti için Bir Ortaklık

Turkish

Havacılıkta emniyeti sağlayabilmek, tek başınaysanız başarması zor bir iştir, ama bir takım olarak hareket ederseniz, çok daha kolay hale gelir. Bu nedenle, EASA stratejisini izlemek adına AEI ile daha yakın ilişkiler kuracak ve birlikte daha sıkı çalışacaktır.

EASA, bu ortaklıkta şuna kesin olarak inanıyor ki havacılık sisteminde uçak bakım teknisyenlerinin görevi doğru değerlendirilmelidir. Teknisyenler uçakların uçuşa elverişli tutulması konusunda önemli bir rol oynamaktadırlar. Ama onların asıl kritik görevi havacılıkta neler olup bittiğini gören ve duyan 'gözler ve kulaklar' olmalarıdır. Uçak bakım teknisyenleri bakım ortamında güvenlik riskleriyle ilgili bilgileri ilk elden alabileceğiniz en sağlam emniyet bariyerlerinden biridir.

Biz AEI ile kurulacak işbirliğinde muazzam fırsatlar görüyoruz ve kurumun faaliyetlerimizde daha aktif yer almasını sağlayacağız. EASA ve AEI, part-66 lisanslarının başvurusu ve edinilmesi konusunda ki uygunsuzlukları engellemek için çaba sarf ederken aynı safta yer tutmaktadır. Sağlam bir emniyet bildirim sistemi emniyeti sağlamak için büyük farklar yaratabilir. Fakat bildirim sistemlerinin faaliyete geçmesi için şirketlerin olay raporlama faaliyetinin desteklemesi ve kişileri suçlamak yerine sistemi teşvik etmesi gerekmektedir.

Kurallarımızı gözden geçirirken kurumsal ortaklarımızdan, bu kuralların geliştirileceği yön hakkında her zaman aktif tavsiyeler alırız ki operasyonel gerçeklik ile tam uyumlu olabilsinler. Şu anda Part-147 ve Part-66 konularında da benzeri bir arayış içerisindeyiz. Yaptığımız görüşmelerin sonucunda hem EASA hem AEI yeterli şekilde part-147 bakım eğitimi kuruluşları tarafından desteklenen güçlü bir part-66 lisanslandırma sistemi görmeyi can-ı gönülden istemektedir. Ayrıca bakım kuruluşlarında yetkilendirilecek onaylayıcı personelin değerlendirmeleri için gerekliliklerin belirlenmesi gerekmektedir. EASA, bir 'bakım çıkış sertifikası – CRS' yayımlanmadan önce gerekli olan süpervizyon ve koordinasyon seviyelerinin belirlenmesi gibi durumların netleşmesi için bu personel grubunun görev ve sorumluluklarının yeniden tanımlanması gerektiğini fark etmektedir. Bu sebeple çoktan bazı değişiklikleri hayata geçirmek için çalışmaları başlattık[1].

Bir gerçek var ki daha fazla regülasyon daha fazla güvenlik getirmez. Daha uygun ve iyi düşünülerek hazırlanmış bir kural riskleri belirlemekte daha etkili olacaktır. Doğru bir kural koymanın yolu o kuralın amacına en iyi şekilde ulaşması için ilgili düzenlemenin geçerli olacağı ortamı bilmek ve faaliyete ilişkin bilgilere sahip olmaktan geçer. Bu örnekte AEI'ın katkıları paha biçilmez değerdedir.

Ekim ayında Reykjavik İzlanda'da yapılacak AEI konferansında, EASA da yerini alacak, AEI üyelerini dinleyecek ve faaliyetlerinin güncel durumu hakkında bilgi verecek. Bizim fikrimizce konferansa katılımımız ortaklığımızı bir sıçrama tahtasına çıkartarak, uçuş emniyeti için güçlerimizi birleştirmemize vesile olacaktır.

Son aylarda EASA ve AEI arasındaki ilişki oldukça olumlu yönde gelişti. Rober Alway ile yaptığım toplantıda uçuş emniyeti için işbirliğini geliştirerek güçlendirmek üzere karşılıklı güvene dayalı bir ortaklık planladık. Üç ayda bir yapacağımız AEI – EASA toplantıları sayesinde çalışma gruplarına yönelik fikirlerimizi görüşeceğiz. İnanıyoruz ki birlikte en üst seviyede güvenlik standartlarına sahip bir havacılık için iyi bir takım olacağız.

[1] Bu konu, mevcut RMT.0097 (145.024) numaralı çalışma grubunda tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca aynı grup NPA 2014-11 i yayımlamıştır.

EASA UND AEI: eine Partnerschaft zur Sicherheit in der Luftfahrt

German

Flugsicherheit ist alleine schwer zu erreichen, jedoch viel einfacher zu bewerkstelligen, wenn man als Team zusammenarbeitet. Deshalb strebt die EASA aus strategischen Gründen nach einer engeren Zusammenarbeit mit der AEI.

Die EASA glaubt fest an diese Partnerschaft, da die Funktion von Prüfern von Luftfahrtgerät gar nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden kann. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt dabei, dass sie die fortlaufende Lufttüchtigkeit eines Luftfahrzeuges sicherstellen. Dies ist jedoch nicht ihre wichtigste Aufgabe. Eine entscheidende Funktion besteht darin, ihre 'Augen und Ohren' im System zu haben, indem sie erfassen, was aktuell in der Luftfahrt vor sich geht. Prüfer von Luftfahrtgerät bilden eine der größten und stabilsten Sicherheitsschranken im System, da sie über Informationen aus erster Hand verfügen, welche möglichen Sicherheitsrisiken im Wartungsbereich bestehen.

Wir sehen die Chance, eine konstruktive Beziehung mit der AEI zu entwickeln und sind zuversichtlich, dass wir von der Organisation weitere Unterstützung erfahren werden.

Die AEI und die Agentur stehen auf derselben Seite und unternehmen alle nur möglichen Anstrengungen um sicherzustellen, dass während der Qualifikation von Bewerbern für Part-66 Lizenzen alles seine Richtigkeit hat. Ein stabiles Berichterstattungssystem kann einen großen Unterschied beim Erhalt der Sicherheit in der Luftfahrt bedeuten. Damit dieses System funktionieren kann, ist es von grundlegender Bedeutung, dass die Organisationen eine Sicherheitskultur einführen, bei der die Meldung von Ereignissen nicht verurteilt, sondern unterstützt werden.

Bei der Überarbeitung unserer Vorschriften verlässt sich die Agentur auf aktive Beiträge aller Interessensvertreter, wie die Vorschriften am besten verbessert werden können, indem man sie so gestaltet, dass sie praxisnaher sind und sich mehr an der operativen Realität orientieren. Dies möchten wir zurzeit mit der Arbeit am Part-66 und Part-147 erreichen. Als Ergebnis wünschen sich EASA und AEI ein starkes Part-66 Lizenzsystem, das durch geeignete Anforderungen an die Part-147 Instandhaltungs Trainings Organisationen unterstützt wird. Ebenso besteht Regelungsbedarf bei den Voraussetzungen zur Bewertung von Kompetenzen, wenn es darum geht, Personal innerhalb der Instandhaltungsorganisationen zu zertifizieren. Die Agentur ist sich bewusst, dass an einer besseren Definition der Funktionen und Verantwortlichkeiten dieses Personals gearbeitet werden muss, zum Beispiel im Zusammenhang mit dem Grad der Aufsicht und Koordination die erwartet wird, bevor ein Zertifikat zum Flugbetrieb ausgestellt werden kann. Aus diesem Grund haben wir bereits damit angefangen daran zu arbeiten um hier Änderungen herbeizuführen[1].

Es ist eine Tatsache, dass mehr Vorschriften nicht unbedingt größere Sicherheit bedeuten. Je verhältnismäßiger und durchdachter eine Vorschrift ist, umso effektiver wird sie Risiken angehen. Damit eine Vorschrift Sinn macht, benötigt es Kenntnisse über den Bereich für die sie eingesetzt werden soll und wie sie am besten angewandt werden kann. Bei diesem Beispiel wird der Beitrag vom AEI von unschätzbarem Wert sein.

Die Agentur wird an der AEI-Jahreshauptversammlung im Oktober in Reykjavik, Island, teilnehmen, um über den jüngsten Stand der Aktivitäten zu berichten und die Meinung der AEI-Mitglieder zu hören. Wir sehen unsere Teilnahme an der Versammlung als Sprungbrett um unsere Partnerschaft zu vertiefen, indem wir unsere Kräfte zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit in der Luftfahrt, bündeln.

In den letzten Monaten fanden in der Zusammenarbeit zwischen EASA und AEI bemerkenswert positive Veränderungen statt. Nach unserem Treffen sind Robert Alway und ich zuversichtlich, dass diese Zusammenarbeit weiterhin wachsen und einen Synergie-Effekt auf die Sicherheit in der Luftfahrt haben wird. Wir haben vierteljährliche Treffen zwischen EASA und AEI vereinbart und begrüßen den aktiven Beitrag der AEI in unseren Arbeitsgruppen. Wir glauben, dass wir durch eine Zusammenarbeit, bei der wir offen und konstruktiv Informationen austauschen, ein effektives Team zur Wahrung eines hohen Sicherheitsstandards bilden werden.

[1] Dies wurde bei der bestehenden Aufgabe zur Ausarbeitung von Vorschriften RMT.0097 (145.024) diskutiert, wobei die NPA vom November 2014 bereits herausgegeben wurde.

AESA ET AEI: Un partenariat pour la sécurité aérienne

French

La sécurité aérienne est difficile à réaliser si on travaille seul, mais beaucoup plus facile lorsqu'on travaille ensemble en équipe. Pour cette raison, l'AESA a pour but stratégique de travailler conjointement et plus étroitement avec l'AEI (Aircraft Engineers International).

L'AESA croit fermement en ce partenariat car le rôle des techniciens-mécaniciens dans le système aéronautique ne peut pas être surestimé. Ils ont un rôle important à jouer car ils assurent le maintien de la navigabilité des aéronefs. Cependant, ceci n'est pas leur rôle essentiel. Leur fonction principale est d'être 'les yeux et les oreilles' dans le système - à savoir, détecter ce qui se passe réellement dans l'aviation. Les techniciens-mécaniciens aéronautiques représentent l'une des barrières de sécurité les plus importantes et les plus robustes dans le système, disposant d'informations de première main sur les risques potentiels dans l'environnement de la maintenance.

Nous voyons des possibilités d'établir une relation constructive avec l'AEI et nous sommes confiants qu'il y aura une participation plus active de l'organisation. L'AEI et l'Agence sont du même côté, déployant tous les efforts possibles pour s'assurer qu'aucune mauvaise conduite ne puisse avoir lieu au cours de la qualification des candidats aux licences Partie-66. Un système robuste de rapports de sécurité peut faire une grande différence dans la réalisation des objectifs de sécurité. Cependant, pour qu'un système de rapports fonctionne correctement, il est primordial que les organisations adoptent pleinement une culture de sécurité, avec pour but d'encourager le signalement des incidents plutôt que de le blâmer.

Au cours de la révision de nos règlementations, l'Agence s'appuie sur la rétroactivité de toutes les parties prenantes pour recommander la meilleure manière dont les règles peuvent être améliorées, les rendant ainsi plus pragmatiques et plus concomitantes avec la réalité opérationnelle. C'est ce que nous cherchons actuellement à accomplir avec les travaux sur les Partie-66 et Partie-147. Comme résultat, l'AESA et l'AEI souhaitent voir un puissant système de licences Part-66, appuyé par des requêtes appropriées pour les organismes de formation en maintenance Partie-147. Il est également nécessaire d'avoir des exigences adaptées pour l'évaluation de la compétence du personnel de certification au sein des organismes de maintenance. L'Agence reconnaît qu'il reste encore à faire pour mieux définir les fonctions et les responsabilités de ce personnel ; par exemple, en ce qui concerne le niveau de supervision et de coordination prévu avant qu'un 'certificat de remise en service' ne puisse être délivré. Pour cette raison, nous avons déjà commencé à œuvrer pour le changement[1].

Il est évident que plus de réglementations n'apporteront pas nécessairement plus de sécurité. Plus une règle est proportionnée et bien réfléchie, plus elle sera efficace dans la gestion des risques. Pour qu'une règle soit efficace, on a besoin de bien connaitre l'environnement dans lequel elle sera appliquée et la manière dont elle peut être mieux ciblée pour réaliser son objectif. Dans cet exemple, les commentaires de l'AEI seront précieux.

Au cours de la Conférence de l'AEI, en octobre 2016 à Reykjavik, Islande, l'Agence sera présente pour faire le point sur les récentes activités et recueillir les commentaires des membres de l'AEI. Nous considérons notre participation à la Conférence comme un tremplin pour faire avancer notre partenariat, unissant nos forces dans un effort commun pour la sécurité aérienne.

Au cours des derniers mois, la relation entre l'AESA et l'AEI a connu des changements positifs considérables. Après notre rencontre, Robert Alway et moi-même sommes convaincus que cette coopération sera renforcée davantage pour devenir une synergie pour la sécurité. Nous avons mis en place des réunions trimestrielles entre l'AESA et l'AEI et nous avons salué la contribution active de l'AEI au sein de nos groupes de travail. Nous croyons qu'en unissant nos forces en partageant ouvertement les informations d'une manière constructive, nous collaborerons comme une équipe efficace pour assurer un niveau élevé de sécurité.

[1] Ce processus est en cours d'étude au sein de la tâche existante en matière réglementaire RMT.0097 (145.024), au cours de laquelle un avis de proposition d'amendement NPA 2014-11 a déjà été émis.

EASA E AEI: Uma parceria para a Segurança da Aviação

Portugese

A segurança da aviação é difícil de conseguir se trabalharmos sozinhos, mas é muito mais fácil quando se trabalha em equipa. Por este motivo, é estratégia da EASA procurar trabalhar em conjunto e mais estreitamente com a AEI.

A EASA acredita firmemente nesta parceria, dado que o papel dos engenheiros no sistema da aviação não pode ser sobrestimado. Estes têm um papel fundamental a desempenhar visto assegurarem a manutenção da aeronavegabilidade das aeronaves. No entanto, este não é seu papel mais importante. A sua função crucial consiste em serem os 'olhos e ouvidos' do sistema; sentirem o que está verdadeiramente a acontecer na aviação. Os engenheiros de aeronaves constituem uma das maiores e mais sólidas barreiras de segurança do sistema, possuindo a informação em primeira mão sobre os possíveis riscos de segurança no ambiente da manutenção.

Vemos oportunidades para o desenvolvimento de uma relação construtiva com a AEI e estamos confiantes de que iremos assistir a uma participação mais ativa por parte da associação. A AEI e a Agência estão do mesmo lado, envidando todos os esforços possíveis no sentido de assegurarem que nenhumas atividades de condutas impróprias sejam realizadas durante a qualificação dos candidatos para as licenças da Parte-66. Um sólido sistema de elaboração relatórios de segurança pode fazer uma grande diferença na aquisição de segurança. No entanto, para que um sistema de elaboração de relatórios funcione é vital que as organizações adotem totalmente uma cultura de segurança, não culpando mas antes promovendo a elaboração dos relatórios de ocorrências.

Durante a análise dos nossos regulamentos a Agência conta com o contributo ativo de todas as partes intervenientes no sentido de prestarem aconselhamento sobre a melhor forma de melhorar as regras; tornando-as mais pragmáticas e concomitantes com a realidade operacional. É isto que procuramos atualmente com o trabalho nas Parte-66 e Parte-147. Como resultado a EASA e a AEI pretendem ver um forte sistema de licenciamento da Parte-66, apoiado por requisitos adequados para as organizações de formação de manutenção da Parte-147. São também necessários requisitos apropriados para a avaliação de competências da certificação do staff no interior das organizações de manutenção. A Agência reconhece que ainda é preciso trabalho para definir melhor as funções e responsabilidades deste staff, por exemplo, relativamente aos níveis de supervisão e coordenação esperados antes que possa ser emitido um certificado de 'aptidão para o serviço'. Por este motivo já começámos a trabalhar com vista à realização de alterações[1].

É um facto que mais regulamentações não irão conduzir, necessariamente, a uma maior segurança. Quanto mais equilibrada, mais bem pensada uma regra for, mais eficaz será a abordagem dos riscos. Para elaborar uma regra eficaz, é necessário conhecimento do ambiente no qual esta será aplicada e de que forma pode ser melhor direcionada para a consecução do seu objetivo. No exemplo dado o contributo da AEI será inestimável.

No decorrer da conferência da AEI em outubro em Reiquiavique, Islândia, a Agência estará lá para fornecer uma atualização sobre as atividades mais recentes e ouvir os contributos dos membros da AEI. Consideramos a nossa participação na conferência como um trampolim para expandirmos a nossa parceria, juntando forças no esforço comum da segurança da aviação.

Nos últimos meses a relação entre a EASA e AEI passou por consideráveis mudanças positivas. Após a nossa reunião, Robert Alway e eu próprio estamos confiantes que a cooperação atual será ainda mais reforçada, tornando-se uma sinergia para a segurança. Marcámos reuniões trimestrais entre a EASA e a AEI e acolhemos a contribuição ativa da AEI nos nossos grupos de trabalho. Acreditamos que, juntando forças na partilha de informações abertamente de uma forma construtiva iremos funcionar como uma equipa eficaz, no sentido de assegurarmos um elevado nível de segurança.

[1] Isto está a ser discutido no âmbito da atual tarefa de elaboração da regulamentação RMT.0097 (145.024), na qual já está a ser emitido um NPA 2014-11.

PROFESSIONAL STATUS – the never ending struggle

AEI and many affiliated associations are working hard to maintain and to improve the professional status of the licensed aircraft engineer. It is a never ending task for us. But it's not only a mission for representatives of AEI or the national associations. It should also be a mission for every individual licensed engineer.

At the AEI Annual Congress in Hamburg 2010 I made a presentation on the subject. I tried to tickle the delegates with some ideas about how to improve our status. Even though we have been under pressure for many years we can also see some improvements that need to be acknowledged. We've had big influence on the development of regulations in the EASA system and we are now taking the next step in the relationship with EASA as the major stakeholder for engineering and maintenance professionals. We also know that our American, Australian friends and other national associations are doing a great job with their legislators. Never the less, I am confident that we all gain from being a part of an international association.

We have also witnessed a growing interest in our field from academics around the world, maybe because of our participation in different international conferences and meetings? Compared to the operational part of aviation, engineering and maintenance is still under-represented in academic research but that will have to change.

First of all we have to ask ourselves, are we really professionals? To find out, I looked up different definitions of 'professionals'. For instance, do we live up to the following labels?

- Extensive education, knowledge and skills
- Members of a professional association
- We are licensed (at least some professions have a personal license)
- Autonomy
- Prestige
- High status

I strongly believe we should be able to tick the boxes for all the above, even if we have more or less weak spots, depending on where we are located on the globe. We also know that all six areas have been under pressure for a long time. To maintain, or to improve the situation we have to start with ourselves as individuals. How do we act and present ourselves? Are you 'just a mechanic'? Is the impression people get when they meet you in coherence with the knowledge, skills and responsibility you have? If not, we have to do what we can to change the situation. Some examples of areas you may have to consider:

- Knowledge and awareness about your authority and responsibility as a licensed engineer is paramount.
- Make sure people, other than your fellow engineers, get the right impression of your profession. Everything counts, from your outfit to the way you act.
- Be a member of a professional association for licensed engineers.
- Make sure your association is affiliated with AEI.

This struggle will continue and I will follow up this article with some ideas for the future of AEI. It is quite possible that this will be a topic when we meet at the Annual Congress in Iceland in October! Not the first time this has been discussed but this time I hope we can make some progress in order to take AEI to the next step as an international and professional association.

Ola Blomqvist
Vice President of Aircraft Engineers International (AEI)
Chairman of the Swedish Association of Licensed Aircraft Engineers (SFF)

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English

Can aviation become safer?

With commercial airline accident rates being the lowest ever in 2015, the aviation industry could be forgiven for allowing itself a huge pat on the back. Yet there is a paradox. A lack of accidents can often negatively influence our safety thinking by instilling an overinflated sense of security.

Behind the glamour, aviation is a tremendously competitive business continuously seeking ways to lower costs. Perfectly acceptable as long as aviation doesn't draw the wrong conclusions from the latest safety figures. Many will be aware of the headline statistic but much fewer will be aware there still remains many incidents that for one reason or another do not make it into the public domain by becoming an accident.

Aviation has learnt many lessons from accidents and incidents over the past 100 years or so. The result of which being a firm understanding of the physics, dynamics and risks associated with flying. Add to the mix the constant improvement in technology and training, the high level of regulatory oversight and one has an incredibly safe form of transport. With air travel expected to increase significantly in the next decade, keeping aviation safe will become even more challenging.

Therefore regulators the world over are now placing more emphasis on the safety performance of an organisation rather than simply checking for procedural compliance with regulations. The difficulty though is ensuring the performance data collected is accurate and does indeed present a true view of the organisation being audited. This obviously requires resources at a time when regulatory budgets are being reduced. The current fixation on cost cutting (under the guise of efficiency) is akin to the regulator having all its teeth removed and so is left with no bite. Within Europe this problem is exacerbated in that national regulators are still trying to find the right balance in order to address the impact of EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) and EU legislation coming into existence.

The aviation industry is currently evolving much more quickly than the regulatory world. Consequently there is a need to ensure regulations and oversight remain fit for purpose otherwise regulators would continue applying outdated inspection philosophies. In engineering and maintenance terms this could reduce safety levels as airlines are constantly seeking the lowest price contract forcing maintenance organisations to deliver to a set price rather than a set standard.

Airlines will be buoyed by the latest statistics. Yet for Licensed Engineers maintaining aircraft, this will undoubtedly manifest itself as a lack of consistency from airlines in their commitment to actually do what is expected in terms of safety; particularly if there is a cost attached.

The task is to ensure airlines do not lose sight of what is important. Despite all the safety improvements over the past 100 years or so, the smallest mistake can still have catastrophic consequences. Therefore the challenge facing aviation is to continue to improve its safety culture in order to eliminate accidents and reduce incidents. After all safe flying is good for business.

Robert Alway,
AEI President

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French

L'aviation peut-elle devenir plus sûre?

Sachant qu'en 2015 le taux d'accident dans l'aviation commerciale était le plus bas jamais enregistré, l'industrie de l'aviation peut se féliciter. Toutefois, il existe un paradoxe. Cette situation réjouissante a souvent une influence négative car elle décuple notre sentiment de sécurité.

Au-delà du glamour, l'aviation représente une activité commerciale qui cherche constamment à baisser ses coûts. Cela est tout à fait acceptable, tant que ce secteur ne tire pas les mauvaises conclusions des récentes statistiques en matière de sécurité. Beaucoup connaissent les chiffres qui font la une, mais très peu de personnes sont informées du fait que beaucoup d'incidents se produisent toujours, bien que, pour différentes raisons, ils ne sont pas connus du public si aucun accident n'a lieu.

L'aviation a tiré de nombreuses leçons des accidents et incidents des 100 dernières années,notamment une excellente compréhension des principes de la physique, de la dynamique et des risques associés au vol. Ajoutez à cela les améliorations constantes de la technologie et de la formation, le haut niveau de surveillance de la réglementation et vous obtenez un moyen de transport incroyablement sûr. Avec les prévisions d'une croissance significative du trafic aérien au cours de la prochaine décennie, conserver la sécurité aérienne sera encore plus ardu.

Par conséquent, les régulateurs accordent une plus grande importance aux performances liées à la sécurité d'une organisation, et ne se contentent plus de vérifier uniquement le respect des procédures requises par les réglementations. Toutefois, la difficulté est de s'assurer de l'exactitude des données relatives aux performances collectées et que celles-ci offrent véritablement une image réelle de l'organisation contrôlée. Cela requiert évidemment des ressources, alors que les budgets de réglementation connaissent des coupes. L'actuelle fixation sur les restrictions budgétaires, sous couvert d'efficacité, reviendrait à laisser les régulateurs les mains liées.En Europe, le problème est exacerbé car les régulateurs nationaux cherchent encore le bon équilibre afin de faire face à l'impact des nouvelles législations de l'AESA (Agence européenne de la sécurité aérienne) et de l'Union européenne.

L'industrie de l'aviation évolue actuellement plus rapidement que les autorités de réglementation. Il est donc nécessaire de s'assurer que les réglementations et les contrôles restent adaptés pour éviter que les régulateurs mettent en œuvre des méthodes d'inspection obsolètes. En matière d'ingénierie et de maintenance, cela pourrait faire baisser les niveaux de sécurité car les compagnies aériennes cherchent constamment les meilleurs contrats en terme de coût, obligeant ainsi les entreprises de maintenance à fournir des services à un coût donné plutôt que de répondre à une norme donnée.

Les compagnies aériennes vont bénéficier des dernières statistiques. Toutefois, pour les ingénieurs agréés réalisant des travaux de maintenance, cela se manifestera sans doute par un manque de cohérence de la part des compagnies aériennes dans leur engagement à faire le nécessaire en matière de sécurité, en particulier si cela représente un coût.

L'important ici est de s'assurer que les compagnies aériennes ne perdent pas de vue l'essentiel. Malgré toutes les améliorations réalisées en matière de sécurité au cours des 100 dernières années, la plus petite erreur peut toujours avoir des conséquences catastrophiques. C'est pourquoi, le défi que l'aviation doit relever est de continuer à améliorer sa culture de la sécurité afin d'éliminer les accidents et de réduire les incidents. Après tout, voler en toute sécurité est bon pour les affaires.

Robert Alway, AEI President

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Spanish

Es posible aumentar la seguridad en la aviación?

Teniendo en cuenta que la siniestralidad en las aerolíneas comerciales marcó un mínimo histórico en 2015, es comprensible que el sector de la aviación se muestre algo complaciente. Y, sin embargo, nos encontramos ante una situación paradójica. A menudo, un reducido número de accidentes puede tener una influencia negativa en nuestra opinión sobre la seguridad, ya que crea una exagerada sensación de seguridad.

A pesar de todo su glamour, la aviación es en realidad un negocio tremendamente competitivo, que busca constantemente formas de reducir costes; algo perfectamente aceptable siempre que el sector no extraiga conclusiones equivocadas de las recientes cifras de seguridad. Las estadísticas publicadas en los grandes titulares son bien conocidas, mientras que son pocos los que están al corriente de los numerosos incidentes que, por una u otra razón, no llegan a convertirse en accidentes y, por tanto, no llegan a la luz pública.

La aviación ha aprendido muchas lecciones de los accidentes e incidentes de los últimos 100 años aproximadamente. El resultado ha sido un profundo conocimiento de la física y la dinámica, así como de los riesgos asociados a volar. Si a esto añadimos la combinación de la constante mejora de la tecnología y de la formación y el alto nivel de supervisión reglamentaria, el resultado es un medio de transporte increíblemente seguro. Teniendo en cuenta que se espera un incremento significativo del transporte aéreo en la próxima década, el mantenimiento del actual nivel de seguridad en aviación constituirá un reto aún mayor.

Por consiguiente, los organismos reguladores de todo el mundo hacen más hincapié en los resultados de seguridad de una organización, en lugar de limitarse a verificar que los procedimientos cumplen la normativa. La dificultad consiste en garantizar que los datos de rendimiento son precisos y que realmente ofrecen una visión fiel de la organización auditada. Esto, evidentemente, requiere muchos recursos en un tiempo de recortes en los presupuestos de los organismos reguladores. La actual fijación por la reducción de costes (disfrazada de eficiencia) está dejando a los organismos reguladores sin herramientas con las que intervenir. En Europa este problema se ve exacerbado porque los reguladores nacionales aún están intentando encontrar el equilibrio adecuado para hacer frente a las consecuencias de la creación de la Agencia Europea de Seguridad Aérea (AESA) y de la legislación comunitaria.

En la actualidad, el sector de la aviación evoluciona mucho más rápidamente que la normativa. Y, como consecuencia de ello, es fundamental garantizar que la reglamentación y la supervisión siguen estando adaptadas a su propósito, ya que, de lo contrario, los organismos reguladores se encontrarían aplicando filosofías de inspección obsoletas. Esto podría reducir los niveles de seguridad en ingeniería y mantenimiento, puesto que las aerolíneas están constantemente buscando el contrato más barato, lo que obliga a las organizaciones a cargo del mantenimiento a cumplir con un precio predeterminado en lugar de con un nivel de servicio predeterminado.

Las recientes estadísticas servirán de estímulo para las aerolíneas. Sin embargo, para los ingenieros titulados que realizan el mantenimiento de las aeronaves, esto sin duda se manifestará como una falta de consistencia en el compromiso de las aerolíneas para hacer realmente lo que se espera de ellas en el ámbito de la seguridad, sobre todo si esto implica un coste.

El reto será conseguir que las aerolíneas no se olviden de lo importante. A pesar de todas las mejoras en seguridad logradas durante el último siglo, el mínimo error aún puede tener consecuencias catastróficas. Por consiguiente, el reto de la aviación será seguir mejorando su cultura de seguridad con el objetivo de eliminar los accidentes y reducir el número de incidentes. Después de todo, volar es bueno para el negocio.

Robert Alway, AEI President

SNAG in a BLIZZARD

In January, a colleague and I had to travel to Vardø for an AOG with a nose wheel steering system problem.

The aircraft and the wheel loader with the snow plow used as shelter.

For those of you not familiar with Norwegian geography, Vardø is far north and far east, at N 70.34 and not far from Russian waters.

It's the only place on mainland Norway that is in the arctic climate zone, which means that none of the months in a year has an average temperature above 10 degrees Celsius. The weather this day was gale force with gusts of strong gale, and a temperature of minus two degrees Celsius with heavy showers of snow. A perfect day to work outside.

I was thinking of our union brothers working for Norwegian Air Shuttle in the Caribbean islands, sweating in that awfully hot climate. To get at least some shelter from the weather, we borrowed a wheel loader with a foldable

The weather this day was gale force with gusts of strong gale, and a temperature of minus two degrees Celsius with heavy showers of snow. A perfect day to work outside.

snow plow from Avinor, the airport operator, and placed it with its wings around the nose of the aircraft as a windbreak.

When we were ready to depart we had shuffle away a snow-dune to get the aircraft moving, after being parked a few hours.

Jan-Kristian Hansen, NFO

Blowing snow, the aircraft seen from the terminal.

Before departure we had to shuffle the snow immediately in front of the landing gear by hand, because the wheel loader could not get to it due to the propeller.

Some shelter from the weather.



To get at least some shelter from the weather, we borrowed a wheel loader with a foldable snow plow from Avinor.

Me working in the nose wheel well.

Despite the shelter, there was enough blowing snow.

SNAG in a BLIZZARD

Our tool box, after arrival at our home base.

All photos by Svein-Erik Vading

'RISK CULTURE' – the

This study is about an argument for introducing 'Risk Culture' as a new component of 'Safety Culture'.

The survey

The ICAO SMM and many other guidance materials published by the regulatory authorities around the world refer to models such as '4 Components of Safety Culture' (Reason, 1997), three categories of organisation culture (Westrum), 'Culture Ladder' (Hudson, 2001) and 'Just Culture' model (Dave Marx — Outcome Engenuity, 2015). As a result, the stakeholders in aviation have so far considered these perspectives in terms of measuring, assessing and developing their safety culture. While these models are valid and — when effectively applied — can have significant impact on organisations' safety performance, it can be argued that they seem to be very much focused on collection of past event data and they do not specifically aim to explore how risk is perceived and managed at different levels in organisations. For example, what/how risk decisions are taken by front line operators and if senior management is presented with the same risks front line staff faces, would they take the same/similar decisions? In other words, have different groups in different levels in organisations more risk averse or more risk taking attitude than each other? If so, what does it mean from a safety management perspective as well as for the overall business?

About Cengiz

Cengiz started his career as an aircraft maintenance engineer and worked in different airlines and maintenance organisations both in Turkey and in the UK. He held aircraft maintenance licenses from Turkish DGCA, FAA and UK CAA. He then worked as a Quality Engineer for SR Technics UK Ltd (Formerly FLS Aerospace UK Ltd) until 2005 and subsequently held the 'Continuing Airworthiness Post Holder' position for Flightline, a UK charter airline. In 2008, Cengiz joined City University London as a Senior Lecturer and also Wake QA as a part time IOSA (IATA Operational Safety Audit) auditor. Since then he had the opportunity to visit many airlines in Asia, Middle East, Africa and Europe and audited their Quality & Safety Management Systems. In September 2015, Cengiz joined the 'Cranfield Safety and Accident Investigation Centre' (CSAIC). He has been a member of the UK Flight Safety Committee since 2010 and recently joined the 'Executive Board' as the Vice Chairman. He has been chairing the Technical Committee of the International Federation of Airworthiness since 2011 and representing IFA in the European Commercial Aviation Safety Team. He currently holds BEng (Hons) Degree in Aircraft Engineering from Kingston University and MSc Air Transport Management from City University London. Cengiz chose the topic of 'Risk Culture in Commercial Air Transport' for his PhD research, which he is currently starting at Cranfield University, UK.

Cengiz started his career as an aircraft maintenance engineer and worked in different airlines and maintenance organisations both in Turkey and in the UK

Find the survey at www.riskculture.org

missing link in 'Safety Culture'?

RISK CULTURE SURVEY IN COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY! **WHY SHOULD YOU PARTICIPATE?**

People's attitude towards risk fascinates me. The term 'Risk' – in a safety domain – is usually defined by two key words, 'likelihood' and 'severity' but particularly in the business world risk is also associated with 'uncertainty' as well as 'opportunity'.

This means risk decisions are often complex and difficult decisions. They also involve a considerable degree of 'subjectivity' due to perception of risk and the biases of the individuals' making such decisions.

So I am going to share with you a couple of my own experiences and observations from the 1990's as well as a case study from 2000's in order to demonstrate to you why I decided to conduct the 'Risk Culture Survey in Commercial Air Transport Industry' and why you should consider participating. BECAUSE YOUR EXPERIENCE MATTERS!

After obtaining my ICAO Type II license from Turkish DGCA in 1990, I started my career working as an aircraft maintenance technician in a small charter company operating a small fleet of B737-200's. At the time, commercial air transport industry in Turkey was quite small and running profitable airlines was challenging. Soon after I joined the company, I was faced with the reality of receiving my wage late every month. In those days, many companies in Turkey used to send a certifying engineer on board particularly to those destinations where there is not technical support or when it was more cost effective. A few months after I joined, one of my senior colleagues, joined the flight crew to fly to a European destination and back. When they arrived at their destination, during walk-around check, he found a relatively large part of a fan blade missing. He immediately called the Captain to show the damaged fan blade. After the initial assessment, since there were no abnormal indications during the last flight, they decided to carry out an engine ground run, which also showed no abnormal engine parameters either. Considering the potential cost of cancelling the flight and sending the passengers to hotel, the captain and the engineer made a joint decision to fly the aircraft back to Istanbul. When the aircraft arrived in Istanbul, a borescope inspection revealed that the engine was beyond economical repair. Obviously it is impossible to prove that if the decision was made not to fly the aircraft back to Istanbul, the overall cost of engine repair and the indirect cost of flight cancellation would have been considerably lower than the overall cost of purchasing an engine. Nevertheless such risk decisions — and in my view certainly excessive/unnecessary risk taking — are never made rationally and heavily influenced by multiple factors.

My second example is from the 1990's when we used to join the flight crew as a duty engineer on board. There was often confusion about the company policy where we were supposed to sit during the flight

Find the survey at www.riskculture.org

as we were not an active member of the flight crew. Occasionally the captain and the engineer who wished to sit in the observer seat in the cockpit clashed with each other, which resulted in engineer sitting somewhere in the cabin and having a sulk. In one of these occasions, one of my friends, who was refused by the captain, wound himself up all the way to their European destination. When they arrived, as he was carrying out the walk-around check, he thought he would give the captain who upset him, a little surprise during the next short leg, which was supposed to be only a 30 minute journey before the final leg back home. He then disconnected the 'Autopilot Aileron Servo Connectors' thinking that they should fly manually instead of the luxury of autopilot. After take off, he was called into the cockpit by the captain but this time he refused to go in. Eventually he connected the servos before their final leg back home and they completed their journey with no incident. In my view this is another example of unnecessary risk taking and perhaps according to some people clearly 'a reckless behaviour'. But this example also proves or disproves a hypothesis. The idea is that people are more risk averse when they are physically exposed to hazards may be true most of the time but there are certainly many examples of people (pilots and engineers) taking risks despite they themselves are at risk as well.

My last example is about a reasonably well-known case study. A B747 — on a night flight from Los Angeles to London in 2005 — experienced a surge and flame out on number 2 engine just after take off. According to a book written by Nancy Regan 'The RCM Solution: Reliability-Centred Maintenance', "The pilots successfully shut down the affected engine and notified the headquarters. The management directed Flight 268 to carry on with the flight to London. Senior Manager of B747 fleet said: "The decision to continue flying was a customer service issue. The plane is as safe on three engines as is on four and it can fly on two." The company quickly assessed the consequences of the failure. If they had delayed or cancelled the flight, it would have cost the company up to several hundred thousand dollars in passenger compensation because of a recently passed European regulation regarding long flight delays or cancellations." Nevertheless, the aircraft crossed the Atlantic safely and had to divert to Manchester due to short of fuel. Subsequently regulatory authorities had discussions about whether the aircraft was airworthy or not and if the aircraft should have returned back to Los Angeles.

So I believe the better we understand the factors (intrinsic and extrinsic) driving or encouraging risk taking behaviour the more likely we would be in a position to address those factors. Because as the saying goes, "The first step in solving any problem is recognising there is one". So the ultimate question I aim to answer is if such excessive risk taking, negligent or reckless behaviours happen in today's

The questionnaire is mainly about two fundamental questions. 'Accepted/Acceptable Risk' and 'Rejected/Unacceptable Risks' and the factors encouraging professionals to take risks but also expects the respondents to share their experiences and observations about mitigation strategies.

SO YOUR EXPERIENCE MATTERS! PLEASE SHARE IT FOR OTHERS TO LEARN FROM YOUR RISK MITIGATION IDEAS AND STRATEGIES!

environment and what other difficult risk decisions today's pilots and engineers need to take on a regular basis.

At the beginning of April, I launched the 1st 'Risk Culture Survey' questionnaire to collect data from pilots, engineers and their managers. The questionnaire is mainly about two fundamental questions. 'Accepted/Acceptable Risk' and 'Rejected/Unacceptable Risks' and the factors encouraging professionals to take risks but also expects the respondents to share their experiences and observations about mitigation strategies. So far I received just under 150 responses. Although the response rate has been disappointing and perhaps the results may be statistically insignificant, I am delighted to see some very interesting and enlightening responses from pragmatic point of view. The questionnaire can be completed anonymously but one of the ways I tried to increase the number of respondents was to offer the opportunity to enter a bursary draw to attend a professional course at Cranfield University if the respondent is willing to provide an email address. This will also give me the opportunity to be able to collect data from the same population every year as I aim to conduct a longitudinal study, which hopefully will enable us to identify some trends or emerging issues in the industry. More information about the concept of 'Risk Culture: the missing link in Safety Culture?' and the link to access the questionnaire can be found @ www.riskculture.org

Regarding the analysis of the data collected so far, I aim to share the details as soon as possible but a quick review of the responses to one of the questions clearly indicates that the brutal competition (as described by one of the industry executives) and some of the external pressures such as consumer protection legislation continually put pressure on front line operators. The good news is that despite the respondents indicate their opinion about the commercial pressure quite clearly, their responses to 'accepted risks' did not include the examples similar to what I shared at the beginning of this article. But equally the responses to 'rejected risks' also confirm that the expectations to accept considerable risks do exist in order to keep the flying schedule. How risks can be mitigated and how commercial pressure can be managed is ultimately key to maintain the remarkable safety performance the industry has achieved.




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