May 19, 2026

Hon. John Zerucelli, PC, MP
Secretary of State (Labour)
House of Commons
Ottawa, ON K1A 0A1

Dear Minister Zerucelli –

Thank you for the invitation to contribute to the Government of Canada’s review of the Canadian Labour Code (CLC). This is particularly welcome given Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association’s (AMFA) growing role in the Canadian labour movement.

AMFA takes great pride in its representation of an increasing number of Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (AMEs) and Aviation Support Professionals working at operators across Canada. We are a craft union focused on improving the lives of our members through industry-leading contracts that reflect the true responsibility and relevance of AMEs in Canadian aviation.

AMEs are directly responsible for upholding public trust and safety through quality and precision work, ensuring that aircraft are safe and fitt for flight. For years their efforts have gone unrecognized in what is otherwise a highly visible and prestigious industry. AMFA has made efforts to change that lack of recognition and pursue conditions and compensation commensurate with skill, training, authority, responsibility, and accountability of the AME.

In the time that AMFA has been operating in Canada, we have experienced firsthand many of those elements of the CLC that fall under the current review. Please accept this submission as a perspective of an employee and employee-led craft union.

HEALTH AND SAFETY

The health, safety and well-being of our members is a top priority of our association and cannot be overlooked in the federal government’s review of the CLC.

Further provisions are required within the CLC to ensure that all workers in federally regulated sectors are protected within their workplace and feel comfortable to report risk without fear of reprisal.

Environmental norms often create complacency that leads to risks. In any given moment those risks, left unchecked can lead to incident and injury. Many measures have been implemented to improve workplace safety and yet we continue to see countless avoidable incidents year after year. It is true that there are always risks inherent to the environment and operation in which we perform our tasks; however, proper job hazard analysis and appropriate safety measures have proven to greatly reduce incidents and injuries.

The value of incident prevention cannot be overstated. Perhaps the only element more important in a safety-sensitive environment is that of a positive reporting culture that protects its employees from punitive measures for open and honest reporting of potential risks and safety concerns.

This is especially critical in aviation where a simple mistake can be seriously costly. On the issue of aviation safety reporting, AMFA believes the federal government should consider adopting and implementing a self-reporting system that encourages AMEs to disclose all concerns they encounter in the course of their duties, even if those concerns may be an error on their part.

Our current Safety Management System (SMS) program is flawed in that it allows too much control and oversight by the operator. SMS is underutilized within the maintenance realm and is seen as a company-controlled system that could lead to discipline or other adverse employment actions.

Despite nominal “company safety promises” that claim to protect employees, AMEs remain reluctant to self-disclose maintenance errors; believing that the information they provide will be used against them. This is a very serious concern and should be considered a threat to aviation safety. As part of a robust safety management system, the Federal Government, along with Transport Canada, are in serious need of a completely independent whistleblower hotline.

The reality of aircraft maintenance is that most of our work is carried out at night and outdoors. In many instances, an AME may spend the entire night working independently and alone in various isolated locations around an airport. The tasks that are being performed are not without risk of injury and often involve confined spaces, use of ladders and stands and exposure to toxic chemicals.

Working alone is not safe. Several operators have proactive working alone policies that mandate a safety-first approach that prevents an employee from being exposed to the elevated danger of working alone. AMFA believes this should be legislated into the CLC rather than fought for in bargaining.

AMEs should not continue to accept the risk of working alone, especially at night when workplaces are vacant, no one is available to help in case of emergency, and maintenance workers are exposed to the elements. Workers are subjected to a multitude of risk and hazards on a regular basis, and part of the mitigation of those risks is having a viable response plan; when you are alone and unconscious, there is no plan.

SECTION 107

As most Canadians understand, our rights and freedoms as embedded in the Charter. These fundamental principles embody what it means to be Canadian. There is little more important to the stability of our society than our basic human rights, and the rights and freedoms Canadians hold dear.

Freedom of association is the critical component that allows us to identify ourselves as members of a union, a church, a political party, or a club, and also to act in furtherance of our identity and beliefs.

The recent and increasingly frequent use of Section 107 of the Canadian Labour Code, deprives large groups of Canadians of this right in the name of economic stability, thereby creating a limit on what ought to be an absolute freedom.

Historically, Section 107 was used by the Government only to refer important questions to the Canada Industrial Relations Board. The Government asked questions rather than imposing outcomes.

Recent applications, however, have been either proactive or immediately reactive, ending or preventing strikes to maintain operations and economic flow. This is a choice – a choice that tells working Canadians that profits and economic growth are exponentially more important than their rights.

We understand that airlines (and railways) are key components of economic infrastructure in a country as vast as Canada – not to mention in an ever-increasing global economy. But that is no more the fault of Canadians working in those industries than the application of tariffs by the Trump government are the fault of steel, aluminum, and autoworkers in Canada.

The government seems to clearly understand the impacts of tariffs on Canadian workers and has taken appropriate actions as a result. The impact of indiscriminately using Section 107 to the disadvantage of workers is less understood.

And AMFA – like all responsible labour groups – recognizes that the Canadian economy is currently in a particularly perilous condition. None of us wishes to see harm infliicted upon fellow Canadians or unnecessary damage done to our economy.

But, what has become clear – especially via the misguided comments of the outgoing CEO of Air Canada during the recent labour disruption related to cabin crews – is that companies in our industry have become very comfortable exercising their option to sit back and wait for unions to file a labour dispute, move through the mediation and cooling off period, all the while knowing that strike or lockout will not be tolerated and the Minister of Labour will intervene – perhaps even proactively.

AMFA believes the CLC review must take an in-depth look at establishing strict guidelines for application of Section 107 only in extreme situations that warrant its use, if at all. And in those circumstances the Act (and the Minister) must ensure that Constitutionally-enshrined rights of workers are not simply ignored in the interests of the company – or even Canada’s – bottom line.

If unionized employee groups are prevented from lawfully withholding their services to the employer, their single biggest leverage with employers is removed. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and the CIRB should be actively involved in keeping the parties at the negotiating table to reach a fair and reasonable deal. The parties themselves are best equipped to determine “fair and reasonable” conditions of employment, particularly in light of exceptional differences in any specific industry.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICES (FMCS)

Related to our submission above on the use of Section 107 is the need for a wholesale review on the current practice and efficacy of FMCS. Generally speaking, the introduction of FMCS into a difficult bargaining situation has the potential to drive the parties forward to strike or lockout, thereby circumventing the overall intent of facilitating harmonious labour relations and good faith bargaining.

There are several key issues that we have observed in the use of FMCS in bargaining:

From the point of view of a union, FMCS is not presently a productive participant in the labour relations process, but rather a necessary component of arriving at the point of labour dispute.

When the FMCS representatives are introduced into an ongoing dispute, it invariably causes significant delay, as mediators must first become fully acquainted with the history and substance of the negotiations. As a result, the parties are effectively diverted from further progress until representatives have completed the lengthy process of understanding their respective positions.

This delay is only part of the problem: more important is the reality that FMCS representatives are in no way subject matter experts on the specifics of the parties’ concerns. Although representatives are undoubtedly experts in labour relations, they are rarely subject matter experts in the industry field of the parties. In hope of developing an understanding of the issues under discussion, too much time is spent educating and explaining the details of the disputes with the representatives. Without genuine subject-matter experts adjudicating disputes, recommendations often emerge from misunderstandings, poor communication, and insufficient reasoning to satisfy either party, thereby further deepening the dispute.

At times, FMCS simply becomes an additional party at the table acting in interest of coming to any solution rather than working towards a good solution.

FMCS representatives must be completely impartial to either party to provide an appropriate service to the bargaining process. Past relationships are more likely to exist between employer and FMCS due to the frequency of interaction. Employer labour relations leaders will deal with multiple labour groups thereby multiplying their interactions with FMCS and CIRB.

Those historical relationships create a framework for understanding, which can be positive and functional, but also may disadvantage one of the parties. FMCS representatives should have adequate time to observe the parties at work at the table before any intervention is attempted so they can truly identify the issues in dispute and potential problems in the bargaining relationship.

In our experience, we have observed a substantial change in behavior when FMCS is involved in the process. While some of these changes have been positive, others have proven negative, largely because the introduction of FMCS often exacerbates frustrations that existed prior to its involvement.

AMFA requests that the CLC review include a focus on the efficacy of FMCS representatives’ involvement in labour disputes and the advantages of ensuring that industry-specific subject matter experts are used appropriately to provide the highest probability of success in negotiations. To be clear, we feel that FMCS provides a valuable service when used within their area of expertise in a purely impartial manner. Expansion and development of this component of bargaining could prove a substantial improvement in arriving at an agreement between the parties without the need to resort to Section 107 or other interventionist methods.

GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION

Regardless of how and when parties enter into a collective agreement, the work of building a solid, lasting relationship between the union and the company has only just begun. The only task more difficult than reaching an agreement is maintaining and upholding the agreement without significant dispute. The traditional dispute resolution method of grievance and arbitration can be extremely frustrating, arduous, and costly, creating an advantage for the employer who traditionally has greater resources than the union and ultimately controls the grievance response.

The grievance process itself is dysfunctional, relying heavily on the employer’s goodwill and generally requires an employer that prides itself on positive labour relations. In today’s economic reality, financial restrictions are often more powerful than the good nature and harmony of the workplace.

Costs drive decisions, and the ultimate reality is that a company’s cost savings and efficiencies are often borne by the front-line individuals who must often compromise the safety and quality of their work to achieve those efficiencies. This results in strained relations where employees challenge change using the grievance process and dispute language interpretations that reduce protections they once enjoyed.

This, however, almost always becomes a circular problem: the grievance response is determined by the same individual that has made the decision on the cost savings or change. Managers who were not involved in negotiations are given free-range to make interpretive determinations on language that is tied to operating costs, often reducing the benefits and overall compensation of the employee without further negotiations.

As a result, the grievance process is only effective in blatant trespasses of clear and plain language that is indisputable. Even then, the company has authority over the resolution, often falling short of providing whole relief, which can then only be obtained through the costly process of arbitration.

Arbitration in Canada is a costly and prohibitively slow process that is often seen as an uncertain and undesirable avenue for the resolution for disputes. However, it remains the only option to oppose an employer who seeks to impose its will on its employees or chooses to ignore the established agreement between the parties.

The employer is aware of the cost associated with arbitration and knows that the value of the dispute must meet or exceed those costs for the pursuit to be viable. This allows the company to violate on a repeated and low-level basis without any real risk of liability or cost to them.

Furthermore, arbitration can often only provide an average or standard resolution; it can rarely accomplish a new standard or make effective change. In most cases the results of arbitration uphold the established norms or standards, making it a near impossibility to break free of traditional standards and old habits, despite the reality of change in our ever-evolving industry and workplace.

The arbitration community in Canada is considerably lacking in resources and faces steep backlog to process the disputes of many. AMFA believes that government-funded arbitration would greatly assist in leveling the dispute resolution playing field between employee and employer.

As a result, AMFA would like the CLC review to examine the possibility of additional levels of enforcement support for union representatives at uncooperative employers through a government-funded arbitration process. We strongly feel that addressing these relatively minor issues earlier and in a more transparently fair way would reduce the likelihood of larger, more costly labour disputes down the road.

The enforcement of a collective agreement in many instances remains a “David and Goliath” battle with a not-so-Biblical outcome. The CIRB should offer deeper levels of support to ensure that employers are maintaining positive labour relations through fair application of the collective agreement that reflects the true bargained intent of the parties.

PROTECTION FOR NON-UNION EMPLOYEES

The primary service a union provides to its members is that of job protection in the form of a just cause provision. Despite the limitations of the grievance and arbitration process previously mentioned, a union – via arbitration – can restore and secure our members employment, establishing protection against arbitrary and unfair dismissal. Once established, the presence of a union changes the decision-making of an employer with regards to termination. However, the same level of protection is rarely afforded to non-unionized employees, and abuse can continue where little, or no enforcement is present.

Although federally regulated employees have protection against unjust dismissal under the CLC, there remains more than enough “wiggle room” for an employer to act against its employees for reasons that would not equate to termination in a unionized environment. This is especially true for those individuals who are attempting to organize a new union, where loss of employment without recourse is a daunting reality that creates an imbalance of rights and protections amongst non-unionized employees.

We have seen this create a reluctance to organize and therefore frustrate rights of association for those employees who would otherwise seek the protections and benefits associated with union representation. Individuals who are terminated coincidentally with organizing activities are left to fight their own legal battles while they are without resources, usually resulting in the individual leaving the fight behind rather than digging a deeper financial hole to climb out of. The risk does not justify the investment, and the worker accepts the reality that they are without a voice and further silenced.

In its review of the CLC, AMFA believes the government ought to establish whistleblower-like programs that support non-union employees and protect the rights of those who are without representation, especially during a union drive, through affirmative investigation and prosecution of retaliation claims. These programs could be modeled on enforcement frameworks used in other jurisdictions. For example, in the United States of America, the National Labor Relations Board has the authority to investigate and prosecute claims of anti-union retaliation.

These programs are effective tools in providing a true reflection of labour relations in non-union environments. Many federal sector employees are working under reduced conditions without any method of change or accountability. Their reality is one of acceptance and humility; they are at the will of their employer and the hope of good will. For every positive experience there is an opposite and those individuals deserve the same level of just cause protection established by unions.

CHANGE OF BARGAINING AGENT & FRAGMENTATION

Since entering Canada in 2022, AMFA has received a great deal of interest from bargaining units currently represented by other Unions. Never have AMEs and aviation professionals had the opportunity to be represented by a craft-specific union made up exclusively of AMEs and driven by a democratic philosophy, whose mandates are geared specifically to aviation specific issues and interests.

Most pilots prefer to be represented by the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) for similar reasons: a union that understands its members' day-to-day lives and employment realities. AMEs are seeking the services of AMFA as their bargaining agent for those reasons but are facing challenges in the process of changing their democratically elected representative of choice.

Incumbent bargaining agents can use the legal system to retain their authority long after the members of the unit have signed cards, paid the required fee, and AMFA has submitted its application for certification. This results in the continued collection of dues from members who have chosen, in some cases by massive majority, to be represented by an alternate bargaining agent.

The primary challenge here appears to be resources – or at least the effective use thereof. Processing times for these applications are excessive and rarely if ever meet the criteria expressed in the CIRB guidance materials.

In cases where the overwhelming majority of a prospective, new bargaining unit have signed membership cards and the CIRB has had sufficient opportunity to validate those cards, a representative vote should be an expeditious process not a laborious, drawn out one. Seemingly straightforward representation changes have been delayed for months due to the CIRBs inability to process disputes in a timely fashion.

It is AMFA’s observation that the CIRB is over-tasked and under resourced. AMFA believes this should be a significant consideration during the CLC review: to address not only the code itself but the body responsible for administering its provisions.

In more complex cases, such as the fragmentation of Air Canada Technical Operations employees from the larger Technical Maintenance and Operational Support (TMOS) group, AMFA has very serious concerns.

As this issue is subject to judicial review, we will refrain from comment in this forum; however, our submission includes contributions from several Air Canada AMEs who can attest to the frustration associated with the prison that is the TMOS bargaining unit. These individuals have a real-life understanding of the lack of functionality in the bargaining unit and know all too well the deviation of community of interest.

Air Canada employee submission:

The foundation of unionism is the majority voice of the members who will form a bargaining unit represented by a union of their choosing. The Canada Labour Code establishes and enforces the certification process for unions and employers.

The current practices of the code in certain aspects ignore the foundation of unionism in favor of union big business: “the necessity of a union to maintain and grow its financial capital through the collection of union dues.”

Harmonious labour relations are not fostered by forcing Canadian workers to be bound to a union they do not support as their bargaining unit representative. Poor unions utilize the political cover of an arbitrator to circumvent the known dissatisfaction of their members, trapping them into collective agreements to minimize the opportunity to decertify. These unions know for certain they cannot negotiate a ratified settlement and portray a false impression to the board that labour peace exists.

The Canada Labour Code desperately requires amendments to protect the most basic rights of Canadian workers to choose a union representative. The establishment of the Rand formula has enabled unions to become highly unregulated businesses at the expense of Canadian workers. Industrialized Unions have mastered the low threshold set by the Canada Labor Code regarding the duty of fair representation and benefit in the collection of union dues.

CIRB board filing 039446-C is a labour lesson that the current practices of the code do not foster harmonious labour relations and infringe upon Canadian workers' ability of freedom of choice (the most basic foundation of unionism). Decades of union entrapment underscored in part by the Canadian Industrial Relations Board have proven beyond doubt that the existing practice is outdated.

The term raid in the Canada Labor Code is broken and desperately requires redefining. It currently encompasses all aspects of Canadian workers seeking to find bargaining unit representation of their choosing. There is a distinct differentiation between a raid and a member self-initiated change of representation.

A union raid must be defined and limited to the actions of a union’s leadership seeking to expand its financial capabilities by preparing and implementing an organizing drive of a pre-established certification with the intent to transfer the targeted bargaining unit into its certification portfolio. The Canada Labour Code should be strict and prevent any labour congress or federation from adopting pacts that prevent union raiding. Competition among unions serves to strengthen workers' rights, as unions will step up to the challenge of providing quality representation. If the majority of a bargaining unit is content with the representation they are receiving, a union raid would be dissolved upon a vote by the membership. Union raids should be subject to the current process of reconsideration and appeal. A self-initiated decertification/recertification or fragmentation should be classified and handled with different terms than a raid. A self-initiated change of union must be defined as members of an established bargaining unit soliciting a union of their choosing to replace their existing union. The processing and handling of a self-initiated change of union representation must be a dedicated process in the Canada Labour Code. After the board decides to issue a certification vote, there must be no provision for reconsideration or appeal.

The board's decision and the decision of the vote cast by the impacted members of 50% plus 1 must be final. Unions must be prohibited from overturning the collective voice of the impacted members. During the process of a self-initiated decertification/recertification fragmentation the existing union must be prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining. The collection of union dues must be suspended from the date the CIRB issues a certification vote until the establishment of the newly certified bargaining agent. At that time, the dues will be reinstated applicable to the newly certified bargaining agent.

Item 2

Collection of union dues for members represented by the same collective agreement spanning over multiple provinces/local lodges must be a constant dollar amount for all members of the bargaining unit. Internal processes of unions to create local lodges to set different union dues levels for members covered by the same collective agreement must be prohibited by the Code.

For Example, the certification of the IAMAW TMOS bargaining unit with Air Canada as noted in Board file 039446-C spans from Newfoundland to British Columbia. Employees that are employed under that collective agreement pay various levels of union dues amounts depending on geographical location and the internal decision of the IAMAW to place members in various local lodges who set their own amounts of union dues. Employees in Nova Scotia pay a different amount of union dues than employees in Quebec and they pay a different amount than employees in Ontario likewise Manitoba, Alberta or British Columbia. All employees work under the terms of the same collective agreement. The Canada Labor Code must be amended to prevent unions from collecting various levels of union dues for members employed under the same collective agreements.

Second submission:

Here is my submission for consideration in the upcoming Canada Labour Code review, addressing the impact prolonged legal delays have had on union representation for Air Canada Tech Ops members, as well as the broader consequences of Section 107 in Canada in recent years.

Since the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association filed for certification in January 2025, an even deeper rift has formed between the TechOps membership and the IAM leadership. While more than 93% of TechOps line members supported the transition to AMFA in pursuit of craft-specific representation, the process has been marked by tension, uncertainty, and delays stemming from drawn out ongoing legal proceedings.

Despite the high level of support, members remained under IAM representation during this waiting period, leading to the TechOps membership specific interests not being prioritized, numerous section 37 DFR’s being filed by members for discrimination and arbitrary conduct and union charges against numerous members. Since AMFA first filed for certification in 2023, the TechOps members have been systematically targeted by the IAM across the country, physically challenged at union meetings and unjustly removed from union positions.

While the CIRB process is designed to ensure stability, the delay in issuing the full, detailed decision on November 18, 2025, had a significant and detrimental impact on employees’ rights to the representation they have pursued for decades.

The 10-month gap between the application and the final decision left members in a representation vacuum. The IAM utilized this time to file motions in the Federal Court of Appeal, arguing that revealing the vote results would cause "irreparable harm" to their reputation. This legal maneuvering effectively silenced the democratic choice of the workers for nearly a year.

The Air Canada case highlights broader systemic issues within Canadian labour law that disadvantage members seeking change of representation. The Code allows incumbent unions to use "judicial reviews", and "motions for stay" to prevent the counting of ballots as a stalling tactic. This allows a union that has lost the support of its members to remain the legal representative and continue collecting dues long after those members have voted to leave and the relationship has become untenable.

The "Fragmentation" hurdles in the Labour code makes it extremely difficult for the highly skilled specialized trade groups to break away from massive, all-inclusive bargaining units, often burying their specific safety, training and wage concerns under the needs of the unskilled majority.

The Air Canada TechOps experience serves as a case study in how "status quo" protections in the Canada Labour Code can be used to delay worker self-determination, creating a dysfunctional environment where legal process takes precedence over members representation and will.

Government intervention under Section 107 of the Canada Labour Code raises serious concerns about the erosion of union members’ bargaining rights.

Recent labour disputes involving Air Canada have repeated allegations of bad-faith bargaining intensify these concerns. When an employer is perceived to undermine meaningful negotiations while anticipating eventual government intervention, it creates a dynamic where the incentive to reach a fair, negotiated agreement is weakened. Instead, the process risks becoming one of strategic delay, with the expectation that Section 107 will ultimately be invoked.

In 2011-2012, this pattern became explicit at Air Canada disputes involving CAW, CUPE, and the IAM were interrupted by direct federal intervention, including back-to-work legislation and compulsory arbitration. This effectively replaced free collective bargaining with government-imposed dispute resolution mechanisms that heavily constrained union leverage. The federal government’s approach had become a “model” of intervention that tilted the process toward employer interests by removing the economic pressure that normally forces employers to bargain seriously.

Over time, reliance on government intervention in this manner can undermine confidence in the bargaining system itself. It risks establishing a precedent where employers may be less motivated to engage in good-faith negotiations, knowing that unresolved disputes could be settled externally. For union members, this represents a fundamental weakening of their collective voice and their ability to secure fair and representative agreements through direct negotiation.

What is needed is a tightening of timelines for CIRB decisions, stricter limits on the grounds for challenging Board decisions, and an expedited process for resolving those challenges. Also required is a reform of Section 37 to prevent employers from bargaining on the assumption that impasse will ultimately be resolved for them through government intervention.

So long as employers can delay and avoid meaningful negotiations while anticipating binding arbitration or back-to-work legislation, the duty to bargain in good faith is fundamentally undermined.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CANADA INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BOARD

Annual reports published by the Canada Industrial Relations Board, as well as AMFA’s own experiences, confirm mounting delays in the Board’s processing of its casefiles. Both employers and unions depend on the Board to issue timely decisions and resolve pressing disputes. Increasing delays, in turn, lead to increased uncertainty and heighten conflict between the parties. The Board must remain accountable to its constituents, which accountability includes the timely resolution of open matters.

AMFA readily acknowledges the breadth and importance of the Board’s responsibilities. Under Part I of the Canada Labour Code, the Board certifies bargaining units appropriate for collective bargaining and hears unfair labour practice complaints on issues such as interference in the formation of unions, breakdowns in good faith bargaining, and unauthorized work stoppages. In 2019, the Board received an expanded mandate to hear cases under Parts II and III of the Code related to workplace safety complaints and unjust dismissals. The Board also hears cases under the Status of the Artist Act and the Wage Earner Protection Program Act.

The Board’s Annual Report for 2023-24, indicates that the number of new cases filed with the Board has increased by approximately thirty percent (30%) since the 2019-20 reporting period.¹ A draft Annual Report for 2024-25 confirms that the number of new cases remains at historic highs. In each reporting period since 2019, the Board has opened more matters than it closed, resulting in a growing backlog.² Average processing times more than doubled between the 2019-20 and 2023-24 reporting periods, increasing from 174 days to 385 days.³ The draft Annual Report for 2024-25 confirms that processing times increased to 416 days over that period. Although the increase in caseload may be partially attributed to the Board’s expanded mandate under Parts II and III, the number of new Part I matters also has undergone a marked increase from 380 matters filed in the 2020-21 reporting period to 486 matters filed in the 2023-24 reporting period.⁴

The increasing delays contrast with provisions in the Code that urge the Board to render a decision no later than ninety (90) days after the close of argument.⁵ Both the Federal Court of Appeals and the Board have acknowledged the truth behind the common maxim that “labour relations delayed are labour relations denied.”⁶ A worker whose car payment is due next week cannot wait a year for the Board to certify his chosen collective bargaining representative. Nevertheless, the Board does not routinely adhere to the decisional timelines identified in the Code.

AMFA has experienced case processing delays firsthand. During collective bargaining with WestJet in 2023-24, AMFA filed three (3) unfair labour practice complaints alleging interference in union activities and bad faith bargaining.⁷ The Board never rendered a decision in any of those cases. One case, although fully briefed by the parties, remained pending for over a year without any decision by the Board. The Board’s inaction resulted in significant bargaining breakdowns and effectively deprived AMFA and its members of rights guaranteed under the Code. The complaints were only resolved as part of a global settlement between the parties following a strike from June 28-June 30, 2024.

AMFA has also experienced protracted delays related to the bargaining unit certification  process. The Board’s published guidance for certification states that it will “aim to process these applications within 30 days of the date the application for certification  is filed with the Board.”⁸ AMFA filed its application to represent a group of Air Canada skilled maintenance professionals on January 13, 2025.⁹ Almost a year-and-a-half later, the application remains pending before the Board. On April 17, 2026, the incumbent bargaining agent filed a notice of conciliation following eleven (11) days of bargaining with Air Canada. It increasingly appears that affected employees will be swept into a work stoppage even though the issue of their union representation remains unresolved.

AMFA similarly filed a certification application to represent maintenance employees at Ornge Air on January 12, 2026.¹⁰ The Board has yet to address even minor procedural issues, and collective bargaining for this unit has effectively been paused until the Board resolves the application. Delays in case processing thus create opportunities for abuse. A party seeking to avoid a loss of certification  or participation in required collective bargaining may forestall these outcomes by making meritless applications to the Board. Such applications can both disrupt ongoing certification and bargaining processes and can take months or years to resolve.

AMFA ultimately attributes these mounting delays to the lack of Board resources. The Board’s Annual Report 2019-2020 identifies seventeen (17) members, which include the Chairperson, Full-Time Vice Chairpersons, Part-Time Vice Chairpersons, Full-Time Partisan Members, and Part-Time Partisan Members.¹¹ Despite a marked increase in casefiles, the Board has fewer members today that it did during the 2019-2020 reporting period. There are currently sixteen (16) appointed members of the Board. Although the Code limits the total number of Full-Time Partisan Members of the Board, there is no apparent statutory cap on the number of Full-Time Vice Chairpersons, Part-Time Vice Chairpersons, and Part-Time Partisan Members and the Governor in Council may appoint additional members to the extent necessary to discharge the responsibilities of the Board.¹² The Board may also appoint third-party adjudicators to hear cases under Part II and Part III of the Code.¹³

In light of the growing delays, it is AMFA’s recommendation that the Government increase the resources available to the Board. This increase may take the form of additional member appointments. Additional members would be able to address and resolve the current backlog of cases. The Board also relies on a staff of Industrial Relations Officers (“IROs”) to process casefiles and mediate between parties. Although IROs do not render decisions, they are instrumental to the Board’s case processing and are frequently successful in resolving disputes through mediation. The hiring of additional IROs may also help address the delays in case processing. Finally, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the timelines for casefile processing identified in the Code should be mandatory rather than directory.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE CANADA INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BOARD

The Board is an expert tribunal and has developed an extensive body of caselaw that employers and unions rely on to guide their conduct and interactions. Because Board members are appointed for fixed terms, they are insulated from political exigencies that could otherwise impact the decision-making process. The legitimacy of the Board’s decisions and the acceptance of these decisions by affected parties are derived from the Board’s perceived independence. Unfortunately, the Government’s increasing resort to section 107 referrals, particularly to deny employees of their associational rights, has diminished the independence of the Board and has led to increased instability in federal sector labour relations.

Again, AMFA has firsthand experience with the consequences of section 107 referrals. On June 25, 2024, AMFA served WestJet with a legal strike notice in compliance with all applicable requirements set forth in the Canada Labour Code. At the time that AMFA served its strike notice, the parties remained in active negotiations. WestJet had previously sought an order from the Board enjoining any strike by AMFA and referring the parties to binding arbitration. Applying the express provisions of the Canada Labour Code and decades’ worth of precedent, the Board had rejected WestJet’s application.¹⁴ On June 27, 2024, overriding the Board’s prior determination, Labour Minister Seamus O’Regan issued a section 107 referral to the Board that in turn directed the Board to order the parties to submit to binding arbitration.¹⁵ Immediately after receiving notice of the referral, WestJet withdrew from all collective bargaining and rejected AMFA’s repeated requests to resume good faith negotiations. AMFA called a strike on June 28, 2024, as a direct consequence of the Labour Minister’s section 107 referral and WestJet’s subsequent refusal to bargain.

The independence of the Canada Industrial Relations Board and the settled expectations of regulated parties are undermined if the Government can effectively use the section 107 process to reverse the decisions of the Board. The judicial review process, rather than direct government intervention, provides the appropriate avenue of redress in the event that the Board errs in its application of law or policy. AMFA calls on the Government to limit its use of the section 107 process only to the referral of unsettled issues to the Board. It should pose questions rather than dictate answers. That use of section 107 is consistent with the long history and application of the provision. AMFA further calls upon the Government to expressly confirm this limited purpose of section 107 through legislative amendment in order to prevent potential future abuses.

Other Areas of Concern

In the backgrounder document related to the current consultation process, Employment and Social Development Canada identiï¬ÂÂÂÂ�ed additional issues on which it sought stakeholder comments. AMFA offers brief observations on some of the issue identified in the document.

AMFA does not seek changes to the timelines for direct bargaining, conciliation, cooling off, or the notice of strike or lockout. The bargaining process is already highly prescribed. As discussed above, AMFA’s primary concern is that the bargaining process should remain predictable and free from interference from third parties. AMFA also does not seek increased participation from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services (“FMCS”) in the bargaining process. As explained above, it is AMFA’s perspective that FMCS participation may become a distraction for parties in active negotiations, as both sides devote energy to convincing the mediators of the correctness of their position rather than directly engaging with the opposite side. Limited scheduling availability of FMCS representatives may also limit the frequency and flexibility with which the parties are able to bargain.

AMFA also notes that while it does not have a significant backlog of open grievances, it has faced challenges in scheduling and completing arbitrations in a timely manner. For example, a recent discharge case at L3 Harris (Trenton) has taken over two years to complete. AMFA attributes these delays to both the relative lack of availability for some arbitrators and permissive case management that allows for frequent detours and inefficient prosecution. Delays are particularly harmful in dismissal cases as employees may be consigned to penury, deprived of income for months or years, as they await the outcome of their case. AMFA therefore expresses its interest in expedited arbitration procedures for employee dismissal cases.

CONCLUSION:

The Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association (“AMFA”) extends its thanks to the Government of Canada including yourself, and the Honourable Patty Hajdu for the opportunity to consult on issues related to the Canada Labour Code.

As stated in its preamble, the purpose of the Code is the promotion of the common well-being through the encouragement of free collective bargaining. The efficacy of the Code in achieving those ends depends on the investigatory and adjudicatory efforts of the Canada Industrial Relations Board (“CIRB”). AMFA’s proposals are intended to encourage the accountability and independence of the Board.

Appendix ‘A’ – Background on AMFA